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publics often only collect as much information as they think is necessary to make a decision
there appears to be little scope for the public to shape policies around CCS in the UK<sup>1</sup>

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• There is no minimal knowledge requirement within a democracy. If CCS is rolled out it will be in \_a i le\_el fe gage e ~a d k ~, ledge.

• Despite very minimal levels of knowledge, members of the public are able to form coherent views about CCS and to articulate clear justi cations for these views. e c te tatd e i the e e ed hale gee blate h e bei gc tide ed b e e .

• There was little difference in the views of lay participants who had had some engagement with energy policy and those with none. e views of all groups was more similar to each other and those of

environmental groups than of industry and UK Government.

• There is no reason to think that providing more information will result in the public becoming better informed or becoming more positive towards CCS. Instead of the public having unformed views waiting to be made positive, they may have latently negative views waiting to be expressed

• Nuclear power is used as a frame to articulate concerns and reservations about CCS, both technically and symbolically. ere is an apparent dichotomy between good, natural, and common-sense technologies (such as wind and solar) and bad, unnatural, and industrial technologies (such as nuclear power and CCS)

• There is a wider question around he i \* Le e \* f he blic i \*di c i \* ab he UK' e \*e g f e. Publics need to feel that they have an i \* i \*high-le\_el deci i \*. If publics are given opportunity to engage on CCS it should be as part of a much wider conversation about energy supply and demand as a whole.

## BACKGRO ND

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