This is the fourth in a series of Constitution Unit <u>briefing papers</u> on the constitutional consequences of Brexit. The papers are intended to inform debate ahead of the UK referendum on EU membership on 23 June. They do not take sides in that debate.

The paper is based on a Constitution Unit seminar on the impact of Brexit on other EU member states. Remarks made by our panellists " $@s^a # (a^a a_j m)$) Ž Consultant Director of the British Irish Chamber of Commerce, Sara Hagemann, Assistant Professor at the LSE European Institute, " $£š^s$ 'fi«-°µë-§š-Jakubowska, Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform, and Alan Posener, Correspondent on Politics and Society for *Die Welt* have contributed significantly to the paper. Given $(*\pm@nš^a)$ " "*" "backgrounds, we draw primarily on examples from Ireland, Denmark, Poland and Germany.

There are many ways in which Brexit would affect other member states. This paper focuses on the political and constitutional implications of Brexit, rather than the economic and social impact. The evidence indicates that:


- The stances that states would adopt in Brexit negotiations would be influenced both by domestic politics and by economic considerations. Some states would treat the UK more favourably than others.
- Brexit could embolden Eurosceptic movements in countries such as Denmark and Austria. This could lead to calls for similar referendums, and, in the extreme, perhaps even to the unravelling of the EU.
- Brexit would alter member states 'relative strength within the EU. States that previously drew on UK support would be weakened, whereas Germany could be strengthened.
- Ireland would be particularly affected by Brexit. Beyond the economic impact, the peace process could be undermined and border controls between the Republic and the North might need to be re-established.

A recent <u>EU-wide poll</u> commissioned by Lord Ashcroft shows that 60 per cent of the public in the 27 other member states want the UK to remain in the EU; only 10 percent want it to leave. Support for UK membership











A vote for Brexit would lead to complex withdrawal negotiations between the UK and the EU. The withdrawal process set out in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty accords each member state a veto



Alan Posener argued that Brexit would put Germany in an undesirable position: leading a union of dependent states. He noted $\[ensuremath{\circ}\]x\[ensuremath{\otimes}\]x\[ensuremath{\otimes}\]x\[ensuremath{\otimes}\]x\[ensuremath{\otimes}\]x\[ensuremath{\otimes}\]x\[ensuremath{\otimes}\]x\[ensuremath$

Brexit could weaken those states within the EU that benefit from UK support:

Free trade is a key policy area where Brexit $\exists \Psi \neg \check{s} c W$ would be felt. In our previous briefing paper, we argued that Brexit could make the EU more protectionist: the states with protectionist inclinations (e.g., France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus) would have a blocking minority in the Council, whereas the liberally inclined states would not. Brexit could undermine the non-Eurozone member states. Tim Oliver argues that the Eurozone might $\neg \check{s} c P \circ a_i \exists E_i \circ \check{s} \cdot \check{s}_i \circ a_i i) = c P \circ B \cdot P \circ B \cdot$



Levels of trade between the UK and Ireland are extremely high, worth between <u>£800m and £1bn</u> per week. Ireland imports more from the UK than from any other country and is the) \tilde{Z} - <u>fifth</u> <u>largest</u> export market. Brexit would undoubtedly have an impact on this trade. Whichever type of trade deal is negotiated, there would be new barriers to trade. Even without tariffs, customs checks would be needed. This could <u>damage</u> Ir_i \tilde{s}^a \ddot{Y} - economy.

No one is certain what the border between the Republic and the North would look like. Brian $\#_{a} a_{i} \cdots \neg a_{i} * \cdots \rightarrow a_{i$

border or a passport border would be required. This could have a significant political, economic and symbolic impact and be <u>highly disruptive</u> $\mathbb{R} \cdot \mathbb{R}_{j} \cdot \mathbb{R}_{j} = \mathbb{R}_{j} \cdot \mathbb{R}_{j}$ We explore these issues further in a previous briem10c. sym